

DIPARTIMENTO DI ELETTRONICA, INFORMAZIONE E BIOINGEGNERIA

## **Financial Fraud Detection**





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# Threats and Anatomy of a Fraud



### Traditional threats:

- Phishing
- Credentials Database Theft

**Banking Trojans:** Malware that aims to perform online financial frauds. Man-In-The-Browser attack:

- steal credentials and private information
- Hijack browser session
- Infect Mobile Devices





### Threats and Anatomy of a Fraud





# **Internet Banking Frauds Challenges**

Internet banking frauds are difficult to analyze and detect:

- Fraudulent behavior is dynamic and dispersed in large and highly imbalanced datasets with different customer's profile
- Scarcity of available informations and data
- Most of the **existing approaches**:
  - Black box
  - Based on Synthetic data
  - Not adaptive baseline profiling





# Goals

- Not focus on pure detection approach
- Support the analysis and the investigation of (novel) frauds and anomalies throught readable model and results.
- Decision support system able to model user behaviour and its evolution





# Approach and System Description

Overview

**User Profiles** 

Undertraining and Updating





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and

### BankSealer

1 Dataset **Exploratory** Analysis

**Decision-support and fraud-analysis** system able to effectively rank frauds and anomalies





# Local Profile









#### 



# HBOS = Histogram Based Outlier Score







# HBOS = Histogram Based Outlier Score



Each feature is weighted \_\_\_\_\_\_ Prioritizes relevant features Discount factor \_\_\_\_\_\_ Forget old data & Model concept drifting



#### **BANKSEALER APP**

### **HBOS** visualization

	index	IP	Timestamp	TipoOperazione	Importo	UserID	IBAN	Numero Conferma SMS	IBAN_CC	CC_ASN	HBOS locale	Undertrained	New User
1	92580	3d64e9f4a188aa034659d1409f90456a	08/feb/2013 21:06:30	Giroconto	20000	dcfc15d4d65e05ebafde6ac9383062aa	e6c2a617f55090de28a24c67dfbedf40	~	IT	IT,8612	29.402365073	~	×
2	91133	99ca402ce2299ecd72e2ebe269b5d35f	06/feb/2013	Bonifici per detrazione	9900	4a4ee6e2ac1h17e20058ad7a8221c1h4	11e6c83f02f065b07725u0bob151+145	,	IT	IT 3269	27 0032775111	1	×
3	3c	9dad3b2601c929e2ce	ece7	1		IT IT,30722	24.5660880611	) /		Х	6475914	×	×
5	101355	86419f50fbda2742c1dba87cd3429476	28/feb/2013 17:46:46	Giroconto	12000	492 <del>007251c425c36c82cd3241c563f7</del> 9	484fe271f1804b3e4291a537bb65279a		IT	IT,44957	25.0995700682	~	
6	92502	dd5d85da0532104875e18e4e32bc152c	08/feb/2013 16:11:24	Bonifici per detrazione fiscale	3863.29	a6f088c1fae1085def1308e532082cb7	73b5047423c9dad3b2601c929e2cece7	1	IT	IT,30722	24.5660880611	,	×
7	99074	cd002daddde353900cc24e4ffc3b235c	21/feb/2013 18:40:02	Bonifici per detrazione fiscale	5643	a7b7a36b2769a1be86d1a544b67007a9	2626bfbc3376dababb639201c9b8ff67	~	IT	IT,21056	24.4493640116	1	X
8	99827	0bdda3afaf28f049483d89d53f021c11	25/feb/2013 09:36:12	Bonifici Italia e SEPA	31000	be2b61118c081429cfbbc0c3d948743b	831687c224f781f106604f984e14f414	1	IT	IT,12874	24.4175445119	1	×
9	89586	2aeddb8850ae946914285eb3bcd28d55	04/feb/2013 16:42:53	Giroconto	10000	41efb45d969e9511b7df6504840cc572	40c200429a2c2a4c7268b3300681e5e3	~	IT	IT,12874	23.6879134642	~	×
10	101627	70c765c7265d92f96a05d91eebb4eb64	28/feb/2013 19:04:37	Bonifici Italia e SEPA	6529.6	8b7ed02e24a297a7ad7b91d28a5b35e1	3ada9624925ed42838bd4b8fab9eae81	×	IT	IT,50809	23.6370584204	1	×
11	98401	d00d1939b4f71eaa199a57fff9cf0c19	20/feb/2013 14:59:10	Bonifici Italia e SEPA	50000	9bc3d0e6065284891a42ce6f9d828c38	65ecb9d1169b23049ec018d31c27af0a	×	IT	IT,3269	23.5882551789	~	×
12	95342	2c2c6f325c547ee1fb0efc01475bc7d6	14/feb/2013 09:17:53	Bonifici Italia e SEPA	50000	f2a7341750c1cc6dc8bea45185a7fe26	60414014d030aa24b4cef90c32fac61f	1	PT	IT,16232	23.5439265229	1	1
13	92842	ba3664bb7ebbf9e8bf4ac0664d65e239	10/feb/2013 19:21:11	Bonifici Italia e SEPA	20000	2a17ed71d9e2c82f39e174e424bf7eb9	e9987193889c72a6dcb94bbd47e35699	×	IT	IT,3269	23.5233646465	1	×
14	92551	d7ab9d7839eb60ff6e606c496e1c848a	08/feb/2013 19:23:46	Bonifici Italia e SEPA	25266.8	435b8226966d2fb40d52bafd6aaa8a93	92a91621f34b668401e8c26050f4e0c6	×	IT	IT,3269	23.4602697196	1	×
15	97221	6da1465327246224216c1c929c339c6f	18/feb/2013 15:09:11	Bonifici Italia e SEPA	50000	f2a7341750c1cc6dc8bea45185a7fe26	60414014d030aa24b4cef90c32fac61f	~	PT	IT,16232	23.2738702047	~	1



#### **BANKSEALER APP**

### **HBOS** visualization

Local	TipoOper	Timestamp	
User feature	Bonifici Ital	25/feb/2013 09:36:12	c11
	Giroc	08/feb/2013 21:06:30	156a
	Giroc	06/feb/2013 20:07:26	51d
	Bonifici per fisc	08/feb/2013 16:11:24	152c
	Giroc	28/feb/2013 17:46:46	9470
	Bonifici per fisc	15/feb/2013 14:28:10	7c82
	Bonifici Ital	08/feb/2013 19:23:46	348a
	Bonifici Ital	13/feb/2013 10:33:06	9cfb
	Bonifici Ital	13/feb/2013 10:51:22	9cfb
	Bonifici per fisc	06/teb/2013 19:28:26	d35f
	Bonifici Ital	10/feb/2013 19:21:11	239
	Bonifici Ital	28/teb/2013 18:16:52	
Close	Bonifici Ital	12/feb/2013 11:24:04	
le	Bonifici per	21/feb/2013 18:40:02	
a e SEPA	Bonifici Itali	14/feb/2013	7d6



.



# Dataset

	# Transactions	# Users
Bank Transfer	371,137	47,650
Prepaid phone	54,141	16,093
Debit cards	34,986	8,415

- Three months
- Skewed and unbalanced distribution of the attribute values
- High cardinality
- Prevalence of users perform a low number of transactions





# **Global Profile**

Two phases:

- 1. Clustering
  - a. Algorithm: incremental DBSCAN with decreasing epsilon
  - b. **Distance Metrics:** Mahalanobis
- 2. Unweighted CLUSTER BASED LOCAL OUTLIER FACTOR: anomaly score based on the distinction between:
  - A. LARGE Clusters LC
  - B. SMALL Clusters SC

**CBLOF** = Min distance of a point from the centroid of the nearest LC







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laboratory



# **Testing and Evaluation**

Time and Resource Performances Fraud Scenarios Evaluation Approach and Metrics Overall Results





# **Time Performances: Testing**

Domain	Test	Time of runtime	
		execution	
	1 day filtered	1 min.	
Pank Transford	1 day unfiltered	4 min.	
Dank Iransiers	1 month filtered	6 min.	
	1 month unfiltered	93 min.	
	1 day filtered	18 sec.	
Dhana Dachargas	1 day unfiltered	25 sec.	
Phone Recharges	1 month filtered	30 sec.	
	1 month unfiltered	2.5 min.	
	1 day filtered	7 sec.	
Dropaid Cards	1 day unfiltered	10 sec.	
Prepaid Cards	1 month filtered	12 sec.	
	1 month unfiltered	1 min.	





### Evaluation of BankSealer: Performances

Generate synthetic frauds based on scenarios built with the collaboration of bank experts that replicate the typical real attacks performed against online banking users







### Evaluation of BankSealer: Performances





MICHELE CARMINATI, R. Caron, I. Epifani, F. Maggi, S. Zanero. "BankSealer: A decision support system for online banking fraud analysis and investigation" Computers & Security, Volume 53, September 2015, Pages 175-186, ISSN 0167-4048, <u>http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2015.04.002</u>



## Evaluation of Banksealer: Security and Quality

**Influence of the granularity** at which the spending habits are modeled on the detection quality.

- System-Centric:
  - less computational requirements
  - more generalization (New Users)
- User-Centric:
  - better catch user peculiarities

**Security against evasion attacks**: assess the robustness to malicious attackers that are aware of how spending habits are modeled.

• Design and implement of an attacking tool that synthesizes **mimicry attacks**: allow a sophisticated attacker to cloak frauds to avoid detection.

1	2	3
97 %	45 %	1%
98%	75%	65%





### Evaluation of Banksealer: Security and Quality





MICHELE CARMINATI, Mario Polino, Andrea Continella, Andrea Lanzi, Federico Maggi, Stefano Zanero - *"Security Evaluation of BankSealer: An Internet Banking Frauds Analysis System"* - ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC) (Writing in Progress)



# FraudBuster: Temporal Analysis 2.0

#### The Problem

Improve detection of frauds that exploits the repetition of legitimate-looking transactions

### Objective

Find a model able to describe the user's transactions in term of their periodicity and detect frauds as "deviations" from the learnt temporal model

### **Proposed Solution**

- Study transactions distribution in the time domain and classify user periodicity
  - Auto-correlation



Almost 60% of user shows a monthly periodic behaviour

- Detection
  - Improved thresholds based on mean and variance
  - Histogram based distribution on monthly basis
  - Dynamic Time Warping on Transaction Time series



+ 30% detection rate improvement





### **Supervised Analysis**





## **Genetic Algorithms Optimization**

#### The problem (Feature Weighting)

- not receive a direct feedback from the analyst
- not completely adaptive
- requires manual parameter setting

**Objective**: Automatically learn best weight configuration exploiting analyst's feedback

#### **Proposed Solution**

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**NSGA-II**: MOGA based on an ordering algorithm that preserve non dominated solutions (Pareto Optimal).

#### **Fitness Functions**:

- True Positive Rate
- Average Precision
- Frauds Penalty





Laboratory



## **Genetic Algorithms Optimization**

	BS TPR	Weighted BS TPR	Improvements
Scenario Misto	58%	81%	+23%





# Thanks!

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