Il termometro dei mercati finanziari (8 giugno 2018)
di Emilio Barucci e Daniele Marazzina

Giu 08 2018
Il termometro dei mercati finanziari (8 giugno 2018)  di Emilio Barucci e Daniele Marazzina

Continua l’iniziativa di Finriskalert.it “Il termometro dei mercati finanziari”. Questa rubrica vuole presentare un indicatore settimanale sul grado di turbolenza/tensione dei mercati finanziari con particolare attenzione all’Italia.

Significato degli indicatori

  • Rendimento borsa italiana: rendimento settimanale dell’indice della borsa italiana FTSEMIB;
  • Volatilità implicita borsa italiana: volatilità implicita calcolata considerando le opzioni at-the-money sul FTSEMIB a 3 mesi;
  • Future borsa italiana: valore del future sul FTSEMIB;
  • CDS principali banche 10Ysub: CDS medio delle obbligazioni subordinate a 10 anni delle principali banche italiane (Unicredit, Intesa San Paolo, MPS, Banco BPM);
  • Tasso di interesse ITA 2Y: tasso di interesse costruito sulla curva dei BTP con scadenza a due anni;
  • Spread ITA 10Y/2Y : differenza del tasso di interesse dei BTP a 10 anni e a 2 anni;
  • Rendimento borsa europea: rendimento settimanale dell’indice delle borse europee Eurostoxx;
  • Volatilità implicita borsa europea: volatilità implicita calcolata sulle opzioni at-the-money sull’indice Eurostoxx a scadenza 3 mesi;
  • Rendimento borsa ITA/Europa: differenza tra il rendimento settimanale della borsa italiana e quello delle borse europee, calcolato sugli indici FTSEMIB e Eurostoxx;
  • Spread ITA/GER: differenza tra i tassi di interesse italiani e tedeschi a 10 anni;
  • Spread EU/GER: differenza media tra i tassi di interesse dei principali paesi europei (Francia, Belgio, Spagna, Italia, Olanda) e quelli tedeschi a 10 anni;
  • Euro/dollaro: tasso di cambio euro/dollaro;
  • Spread US/GER 10Y: spread tra i tassi di interesse degli Stati Uniti e quelli tedeschi con scadenza 10 anni;
  • Prezzo Oro: quotazione dell’oro (in USD)
  • Spread 10Y/2Y Euro Swap Curve: differenza del tasso della curva EURO ZONE IRS 3M a 10Y e 2Y;
  • Euribor 6M: tasso euribor a 6 mesi.
Disclaimer: Le informazioni contenute in questa pagina sono esclusivamente a scopo informativo e per uso personale. Le informazioni possono essere modificate da finriskalert.it in qualsiasi momento e senza preavviso. Finriskalert.it non può fornire alcuna garanzia in merito all’affidabilità, completezza, esattezza ed attualità dei dati riportati e, pertanto, non assume alcuna responsabilità per qualsiasi danno legato all’uso, proprio o improprio delle informazioni contenute in questa pagina. I contenuti presenti in questa pagina non devono in alcun modo essere intesi come consigli finanziari, economici, giuridici, fiscali o di altra natura e nessuna decisione d’investimento o qualsiasi altra decisione deve essere presa unicamente sulla base di questi dati.

Pillole dal Rapporto di Stabilità Finanziaria di Banca d’Italia 1-2018
di Emilio Barucci

Giu 06 2018
Pillole dal Rapporto di Stabilità Finanziaria di Banca d’Italia 1-2018  di Emilio Barucci

FAMIGLIE

  • Il debito delle famiglie in rapporto al reddito disponibile si mantiene stabile. La quota dei mutui a tasso fisso è cresciuta negli ultimi dieci anni di dieci punti (37%).
  • La crescita dell’indebitamento per finalità di consumo cresce soprattutto tra le famiglie con redditi superiori alla mediana.
  • Il tasso di insolvenza nei prestiti delle famiglie è ai minimi da dieci anni. La percentuale delle famiglie vulnerabili e l’incidenza del loro debito sul totale sono pari all’1.8% e all’11,4%, la metà del dato del 2008. Il dato non subirebbe variazioni significative anche in presenza di un aumento dei tassi di interesse di 200 punti base e di un andamento negativo dell’economia.

 

IMPRESE

  • La leva finanziaria delle imprese si è ridotta al 40%, un dato solo di due punti percentuali superiore a quello medio dell’area euro. Dal 2011 le imprese hanno destinato una parte cospicua dei profitti all’aumento del capitale di rischio.
  • Aumenta il ricorso all’emissione di titoli obbligazionari da parte delle imprese: 20 miliardi nel 2017 contro una media di 6 miliardi nei tre anni precedenti.
  • Il tasso medio annuo di deterioramento dei prestiti è passato dal 4.1% nel 2016 al 3.2%. Il numero di fallimenti è in diminuzione per il terzo anno consecutivo. I nuovi crediti deteriorati in rapporto al totale dei prestiti sono tornati su livelli precedenti la crisi.
  • Secondo il modello di Banca d’Italia, il numero di imprese vulnerabili da un punto di vista finanziario è passato dal 33% nel 2007 al 25% nel 2016.

 

BANCHE

  • Il credito bancario è in aumento ma il ciclo finanziario è ancora debole. Il rapporto tra credito bancario e PIL (credit-GDP gap) è ancora sotto di dieci punti percentuali rispetto al trend di lungo periodo. La forbice diminuirà il prossimo anno ma non scomparirà.
  • L’esposizione debitoria delle banche nel mercato MTS repo nei primi mesi 2018 è inferiore di circa un quarto rispetto alla media del 2017.
  • L’ammontare di rifinanziamento presso l’Eurosistema è costante e la liquidità in eccesso è elevata.
  • Il Texas ratio delle banche classificate come significative è diminuito di dieci punti percentuali ed è pari all’86%.
  • La raccolta obbligazionaria delle banche è in diminuzione (pari a 267 miliardi), di cui 39 in strumenti subordinati (15 detenuti da famiglie). I collocamenti sui mercati internazionali negli ultimi tre anni sono stati pari soltanto a 80 miliardi (pari al 2.6% del totale delle consistenze).
  • Il deficit di passività idonee secondo i requisiti della Bank Recovery Resolution DIrective potrebbe essere tra 30 e 60 miliardi per le banche italiane con un aumento del costo della raccolta stimato tra 10 e 30 punti base e un calo del margine di intermediazione tra il 2 e l’8%.
  • Il LCR delle banche non verrebbe impattato in modo significativo da un aumento dei tassi di interesse (fino a 300 punti base), soltanto il 5% delle banche andrebbe sotto la soglia di 100.
  • Il rischio di tasso per le banche è limitato: un aumento di 200 punti base porterebbe ad un aumentomedio del valore economico dei fondi propri dei principali 11 gruppi
  • pari al 2.9%.
  • Le banche italiane significative hanno un deficit di capitale contenuto rispetto alle banche europee (150 punti base, il leverage ratio è pari a 6 contro una media pari a 5.5).

 

MONDO ASSICURATIVO E FONDI COMUNI

  • Le compagnie di assicurazioni detengono il 43% degli attivi in titoli di Stato.
  • La quota di riserve matematiche relative a polizze vita con garanzie pari o inferiore a 1% è pari al 55% (era 46% nel 2016). Il volatility adjustment porta ad un innalzamento dell’indice di solvibilità del 9% contro un 24% medio a livello europeo.
  • Un’estensione del Last liquid point per la valutazione delle riserve porterebbe ad una riduzione del margine di solvibilità del 7%, misura inferiore a quella delle compagnie europee.
  • I PIR hanno un patrimonio di 12 miliardi di cui oltre il 56% investito in società non finanziarie residenti (36% in azioni, 20% in obbligazioni che rappresentano il 35% del totale delle emissioni).

 

SISTEMA FINANZIARIO

Le consistenze nette di CDS su rischio Italia (Stato, banche, imprese) sono in diminuzione.

  • Nel 2017, la quota di titoli pubblici italiani detenuta dalla Banca d’Italia è salita di 5 punti al 19%, quella delle banche è diminuita (dal 17.8 al 15.3%), sono rimaste stabili quelle delle famiglie (5.3%) e degli investitori esteri (33.2%).
  • La vita media residua dei tioli di Stato è 6.8 anni. Il costo medio dei tioli di Stato in essere è ai minimi (2.7%), il costo medio sulle nuove emissioni è 0.60%.

ESMA bans binary options for retail salers

Giu 06 2018

The European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) has now formally adopted new measures for the provision of binary options and contracts for differences (CFDs). The measures provide a prohibition on the marketing, distribution or sale of binary options to retail investors, starting to apply the 2 July 2018.

In this way, the Authority aims also at preventing the purchase of these contracts by unaware “venture web-capitalists” trying to make easy money through these investors. Namely, Steven Maijoor, ESMA’s Chair, claims that “..ESMA’s prohibition on the marketing, distribution or sale of binary options to retail investors addresses the significant investor protection concerns caused by the characteristics of this product.”

Concerning CFD, although a full ban has not be imposed to retail investors, several restrictions  will be adopted from the beginning of this August. The product intervention measures ESMA has adopted include:

1.    Leverage limits on the opening of a position by a retail client from 30:1 to 2:1, which vary according to the volatility of the underlying:

·         30:1 for major currency pairs;

·         20:1 for non-major currency pairs, gold and major indices;

·         10:1 for commodities other than gold and non-major equity indices;

·         5:1 for individual equities and other reference values;

·         2:1 for cryptocurrencies;

2.    A margin close out rule on a per account basis. This will standardise the percentage of margin (at 50% of minimum required margin) at which providers are required to close out one or more retail client’s open CFDs;

3.    Negative balance protection on a per account basis. This will provide an overall guaranteed limit on retail client losses;

4.    A restriction on the incentives offered to trade CFDs; and

5.    A standardised risk warning, including the percentage of losses on a CFD provider’s retail investor accounts.

“The measures ESMA has taken today are a significant step towards greater investor protection in the EU”, continued the ESMA Chair. ” The new measures on CFDs will, for the first time, ensure that investors cannot lose more money than they put in, restrict the use of leverage and incentives, and provide understandable risk warnings for investors.”

These measures in the official languages of the EU and they will remain in force for a period of three months from the date of application. Before the end of the three months, ESMA will review the product intervention measures and consider the need to extend them for a further three months.

Notice of ESMA’s Product Intervention Decisions in relation to CFD and binary options (PDF)

Contract for differences definition in Eur-lex (HTML)

Binary Option definition in Eur-lex (HTML)

ECB: access to finance of SMEs in the EU

Giu 06 2018

The European Central Bank (ECB) published today the yearly analytical report collecting the result of the  Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises (SAFE) for the year 2017. The survey is conducted on a sample of Small-Medium Enterprises (SME) across Europe. Table 1 summarizes the number of SMEs involved in the survey for each member of the European Union (EU).

The results refer to the period from October 2017 to March 2018. This survey round was conducted between 12 March and 20 April 2018. The total EU countries sample size was 16 656 firms. The euro area sample size was 11 733 firms, of which 10,720 (91%) had fewer than 250 employees.

 

Table 1 : SMEs sample by EU country (Source: ECB, SAFA 2017)

The main results are summarized in the ECB press release of the SAFA 2017.

  • SMEs continued to indicate improvements in availability of external sources of finance
  • Lower, albeit still high, percentage of SMEs reported increasing turnover and profits
  • Fewer SMEs reported falling interest rates on bank loans

The financial situation of firms further improved, albeit at a slower pace than in the previous survey round. From October 2017 to March 2018, the percentage of euro area SMEs reporting a higher turnover decreased (24%, down from 27%). The moderation in turnover was also reflected in profits, as 4% of euro area SMEs reported increases, down from 5%, in a context of growing labour costs (50%, up from 49%) and other production costs (54%, up from 48%).

In net terms, SMEs continued to indicate improved availability of bank loans (14%, from 12%), with the highest percentages in Spain (24%), Portugal (19%), and Ireland (18%). SMEs attributed these improvements to a persistently high willingness of banks to provide credit (19%, from 18%). Although Greece continued to lag behind the other euro area countries, there are also signs there of an incremental improvement in the willingness of banks to provide credit since the beginning of 2017.

SMEs signalled that the fall in interest rates on bank loans became more muted (with a net percentage of SMEs confirming -1%, compared with -5% in the previous round). At the same time, they registered a moderate increase in other costs of financing, such as charges, fees and commissions (26%, from 30%).

To emphasize the importance of banks for the financing decisions of firms, this survey round included ad hoc questions on firm/bank relationships along three dimensions: number, duration and exclusivity. Results suggest that SMEs tend to do business with less than three banks, on average. Long-term relationships prevail across different firm sizes, however, the concentration of loans varies across countries, reflecting the heterogeneity of financial structures across the various euro area countries.

SAFE Report 2017 (PDF)

FSB: TLAC standard for G-SIBs banks at test bench

Giu 06 2018

In November 2015 the Financial Stability Board (FSB) issued a new standard on the adequacy of total loss-absorbing and recapitalisation capacity for Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs) in resolution (‘the TLAC standard’).

The main principle upon which the entire TLAC standard is built is that G-SIBs banks must have sufficient loss-absorbing and recapitalisation capacity available in resolution to implement an orderly resolution that minimises any impact on financial stability, ensures the continuity of critical functions, and avoids exposing taxpayers (that is, public funds) to loss with a high degree of confidence.

In practice, the TLAC standard seeks to ensure that G-SIBs have at all times sufficient loss-absorbing and recapitalisation capacity available so that in case of failure they can be resolved  in without affecting financial stability despite their systemic importance.

The TLAC standard will be phased in from January 2019. The FSB made a commitment to report, by the time of the G20 Leaders’ Summit in June 2019, on whether the implementation of the TLAC standard is proceeding in a manner consistent with the timelines and objectives set out in the TLAC standard and to identify any technical issues or operational challenges in the implementation.

 

FSB Total Loss Absorbing Capacity Standards (PDF)

FSB TLAC – call for public feedback (PDF)

BIS reports on CDS global market

Giu 06 2018

The Bank of International Settlement (BIS) quarterly review this June focused on the CDS market, ten years the CDS “Bangs”. The CDS Bangs were the first real attempt to build a Standardized CDS market, to face this market’s shortcomings, which were fully unveiled by the Great Financial Crisis.

Many authors (see [2] and references therein) document how the shape of the market eventually resulting from these Standardization processes should be smoother and less resilient to regulatory interventions on a global scale. BIS Quarterly Review sheds now light on these forecasts. Ten years after the first CDS Bang was issued by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), a sufficiently informative dataset is available.

The  first issue to be tackled when shaping the new CDS market, is the contracts’s schedule of payments. On the buyer’s side, this task can be accomplished in a relatively simple way. Standard contracts provide for quarterly payments of standardized coupons, so the cash flow is easy to retrieve as long as the interbank money market remains stable. On the seller’s side, a thorough analysis is conducted on the Reference Entity’s default date, payment dates of bonds recoveries depending on different covenants.

When all contracts are signed based on the Standard ISDA format, it is easy for a Central Counterparty (CCP) to net opposite position among a restricted number of big dealers.  The provision for an Upfront Payment to be coupled with the standardized coupon piles liquidity up the CCP table. In this way, it is easier for the CCP to fulfill its major role of counterparty risk mitigator.

 

Figure 1: The CDS Market; Source: BIS, 2018 [1]

Figure 1 shows the evolution of the CDS market by notional amount (left), notional amount after netting opposite positions (center) and by maturity buckets (right). The CCP is able to accomplish the task of actually reducing the notional amount to the netted values by guaranteeing the netting transactions. It is not straightforward to compute the clearing rate out of the number of cleared contracts. (see the discussion in the BIS complete report [1]). Figure 2 shows that, despite the different metrics used in computing such ratios, the upward trending importance of  CCPs is quite clear.

 

Figure 2: The CDS Market and CCP; Source: BIS, 2018 [1]  

The number of cleared contracts increased rapidly from the CDS Standardization of contracts, reaching a peak of half the number of contracts according to some of the proposed ratios. The presence of CCP is relevant especially in view of the rise of contracts written on Sovereign Refererence Entities, which shifted from the 2% of total CDS share before the crisis  to a peak of nearly 17% of total CDS share in 2015, and hovers actually around 15%. CDS entail exposure to two types of risk: the underlying credit risk of the reference entity and the counterparty risk faced by the CDS protection buyer.

 

Figure 3: The CDS Market by Reference Entity; Source: BIS, 2018 [1]

 

The BIS report argues that both types of risk have diminished. The underlying credit risks have shifted towards sovereigns and portfolios of underlying reference securities with overall better credit ratings. The rise of CCPs and the increased standardisation in the CDS market facilitated the netting of exposures. This, in turn, has helped to lower counterparty risks. Despite these structural changes, credit risks is not retained to be concentrated at specific counterparty types.

 

[1] Bis Quarterly Review 2018 (PDF)

[2] Colozza, T. (2013) Standardization of the Credit Default Swaps Market

Il termometro dei mercati finanziari (1 giugno 2018)
di Emilio Barucci e Daniele Marazzina

Giu 02 2018
Il termometro dei mercati finanziari (1 giugno 2018)  di Emilio Barucci e Daniele Marazzina

Continua l’iniziativa di Finriskalert.it “Il termometro dei mercati finanziari”. Questa rubrica vuole presentare un indicatore settimanale sul grado di turbolenza/tensione dei mercati finanziari con particolare attenzione all’Italia.

Commento generale

  • La pressione sui titoli di Stato italiani ha portato ad un innalzamento della parte a breve della curva e ad una diminuzione della sua pendenza;
  • Non è solo lo spread italiano ad aumentare, quello spagnolo ha preso 50 punti base in un mese;
  • Il differenziale tra i tassi di interesse americani e tedeschi è sempre ai massimi.

Significato degli indicatori

  • Rendimento borsa italiana: rendimento settimanale dell’indice della borsa italiana FTSEMIB;
  • Volatilità implicita borsa italiana: volatilità implicita calcolata considerando le opzioni at-the-money sul FTSEMIB a 3 mesi;
  • Future borsa italiana: valore del future sul FTSEMIB;
  • CDS principali banche 10Ysub: CDS medio delle obbligazioni subordinate a 10 anni delle principali banche italiane (Unicredit, Intesa San Paolo, MPS, Banco BPM);
  • Tasso di interesse ITA 2Y: tasso di interesse costruito sulla curva dei BTP con scadenza a due anni;
  • Spread ITA 10Y/2Y : differenza del tasso di interesse dei BTP a 10 anni e a 2 anni;
  • Rendimento borsa europea: rendimento settimanale dell’indice delle borse europee Eurostoxx;
  • Volatilità implicita borsa europea: volatilità implicita calcolata sulle opzioni at-the-money sull’indice Eurostoxx a scadenza 3 mesi;
  • Rendimento borsa ITA/Europa: differenza tra il rendimento settimanale della borsa italiana e quello delle borse europee, calcolato sugli indici FTSEMIB e Eurostoxx;
  • Spread ITA/GER: differenza tra i tassi di interesse italiani e tedeschi a 10 anni;
  • Spread EU/GER: differenza media tra i tassi di interesse dei principali paesi europei (Francia, Belgio, Spagna, Italia, Olanda) e quelli tedeschi a 10 anni;
  • Euro/dollaro: tasso di cambio euro/dollaro;
  • Spread US/GER 10Y: spread tra i tassi di interesse degli Stati Uniti e quelli tedeschi con scadenza 10 anni;
  • Prezzo Oro: quotazione dell’oro (in USD)
  • Spread 10Y/2Y Euro Swap Curve: differenza del tasso della curva EURO ZONE IRS 3M a 10Y e 2Y;
  • Euribor 6M: tasso euribor a 6 mesi.
Disclaimer: Le informazioni contenute in questa pagina sono esclusivamente a scopo informativo e per uso personale. Le informazioni possono essere modificate da finriskalert.it in qualsiasi momento e senza preavviso. Finriskalert.it non può fornire alcuna garanzia in merito all’affidabilità, completezza, esattezza ed attualità dei dati riportati e, pertanto, non assume alcuna responsabilità per qualsiasi danno legato all’uso, proprio o improprio delle informazioni contenute in questa pagina. I contenuti presenti in questa pagina non devono in alcun modo essere intesi come consigli finanziari, economici, giuridici, fiscali o di altra natura e nessuna decisione d’investimento o qualsiasi altra decisione deve essere presa unicamente sulla base di questi dati.

The EOS Blockchain Launch

Giu 01 2018
CoinDesk, a dedicated blog to Fintech and cryptocurrencies, reported on the release of the EOS Blockchain launch, which will occurr this weekend. First announced in 2017, the EOS project has been fundraising for nearly a year, raising a reported $4 billion in what many are claiming is the largest amount ever collected by a team creating a custom cryptocurrency.

The fervor around the unveiling is, in part, due to the diverse discussions long surrounding the project. As detailed by CoinDesk, EOS has long been a target of criticism for its vision and execution, though it has attracted advocates who believe it offers a decentralized alternative to the cloud hosting services that currently dominate the lucrative market for data storage.

With public trading for the cryptocurrency already well underway, all eyes are likely to be on the markets, in addition to technology forums, where token holders are already queuing up with questions related to trading, token registration, airdrops and wallet compatibility. Clarity has been hard to come by, something that hasn’t been helped by a lack of dialogue from those who have been most publicly associated with the project.

Nevertheless, the upcoming launch process is not wholly mysterious. Most notably, the launch will begin 23 hours after the protocol’s publisher, Block.one, makes the code available as open-source software. The release of the code, however, will be the extent of Block.one’s involvement in the launch.

From there, a community of aspiring block producers — various entities competing to act as validators in the network’s delegated proof-of-stake system (dPOS) — will subsequently pick up the baton as part of an elaborate process that appears unorthodox, even in the evolving world of new blockchain technologies.

CoinDesk: The EOS Blockchain Launch: What Should Happen (HTML)

Central Counter Party Clearing in Europe

Giu 01 2018

Yves Mersch, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at the Frankfurt Finance Summit, Frankfurt, 29 May 2018 illustrated the key role played by central counterparties in Europe. During the 2008 financial crisis, counterparty risks became infamous. The failure of Lehman Brothers and the large losses suffered by AIG in over-the-counter derivatives markets revealed that there were counterparty risks throughout the entire financial system. This was due to the domino effect of counterparty defaults in leveraged products.

In the 2009 summit in Pittsburgh, G20 countries agreed to move all standardised derivatives contracts to clearing through central counterparties (or CCPs), yet CCPs can only make the financial system safer if they are safe themselves.

In the European Union, they are subject to a comprehensive regulatory framework. The European Market Infrastructure Regulation (or EMIR) ensures that they hold robust resources to deal with financial distress. The global regulatory push towards central clearing has contributed to making CCPs extremely important parts of the global financial system. In 2009, just 40% of all interest rate derivatives contracts were cleared through CCPs, but by 2017 this had increased to 83%.

The rising importance of CCPs means that their supervisory framework needs to be reformed. Most clearing is now done across borders and is strongly concentrated in a limited number of EU CCPs, which have become systemically important for the EU as a whole.

Furthermore, two of these CCPs are based in the United Kingdom and they currently clear around 95% of euro-denominated interest rate derivatives and around 30% of euro-denominated repos. Thus, a significant disturbance involving a major UK CCP could affect financial stability and market functioning across the EU.

On top of this, most of the liquidity provided by central banks tends to be channelled through the repo market. The United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU means the supervisory framework for non-EU countries must be adapted. EU authorities must continue to be able to not only closely monitor UK CCPs but ensure they comply with EU regulations.

In this sense, precautions have to be taken to ensure that CCPs do not become a weak point for monetary policy and the currencies issued by central banks. CCPs can pose significant risks to the smooth operation of payment systems and to monetary policy transmission in times of market stress.

For example, market volatility or failures in CCPs’ risk management may affect liquidity within the financial system and that of CCP users, who are typically monetary policy counterparties and key participants in payment systems. In extreme situations, liquidity shortfalls could foster contagion and lead to CCPs and banks becoming distressed.

This could mean the ECB needs to provide liquidity to systemic CCPs or to their members to ensure that payment systems continue to function smoothly and that monetary policy can be transmitted effectively. It is clear that, in such cases, liability and control need to be well aligned: the ECB must be able to monitor and control the risks posed by CCPs.

CCPs are also directly relevant for payment systems. Cleared markets represent a significant share of financial markets as a whole, meaning that CCPs are settling large payment volumes. In order to ensure that payment systems continue to function smoothly, the ECB must ensure that CCPs have appropriate arrangements in place for liquidity management and settlement in euro.

Moreover, in the past CCPs have increased margins and collateral haircuts beyond the levels required by prudential standards or their own risk models. But doing so they may cause liquidity strains and increase volatility in bond prices which, in turn, affects the transmission of monetary policy. To be clear, CCPs should of course make sure they remain resilient to liquidity risks. But they should do so in a predictable manner and based on sound risk models that should not undercut monetary policy decisions.

Yves Mersch: ECB Clearing – the open race, full press release (HTML)

EBA: Regulatory standards for economic downturn and LGD estimation

Giu 01 2018