EIOPA’s opinion on SII review
a cura di Silvia Dell’Acqua

Gen 02 2021
EIOPA’s opinion on SII reviewa cura di Silvia Dell’Acqua

Last 17th December 2020 EIOPA published its opinion regarding the review of the SII directive. It will now be reviewed by the European Commission, who is finalizing its proposal by 21Q3. The proposal will be then then discussed and drafted into a low by the European Parliament.

The review process started last February 2019, with the European Commission calling EIOPA for an advice and the latter publishing a number of public consultations, including a complementary information request to consider the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic (see https://www.finriskalert.it/2020-review-of-sii-a-cura-di-silvia-dellacqua/ and https://www.finriskalert.it/european-commission-and-sii-review-a-cura-di-silvia-dellacqia/).

The SII review is focused on adapting the current regulation to the new economic context (especially the persistence of low interest rates), with the ultimate goal of ensuring a better protection to the policyholders, without penalizing too much the insurance industry. The main areas EIOPA puts under the spotlight are:

  • LTG measures and equity risk (RF extrapolation, VA, RM and LTE)
  • SCR (Interest Rate Risk)
  • Reporting and disclosure
  • Proportionality
  • Macroprudential policy
  • Recovery and resolution
  • Insurance guarantee schemes
  • Long-Term Guarantee (LTG) measures and equity risk

The SII directive should consider that liquid interest rates exceed the Last Liquid Point (LLP), currently set to 20 years for the EUR currency. From this point, the Smith-Wilson (SW) extrapolation starts, driving the forward rates towards a defined target value (UFR – Ultimate Forward Rate, set to 3.75% for EUR in 2020) within a certain convergence period (40 years for EUR).

In the previous consultation, EIOPA suggested to take the market information into account by choosing a later LLP (e.g. 30 or 50y for EUR) or by considering a different extrapolation method, with an expected severe increase in both TP and SCR, particularly for firms characterized by long duration businesses.

This time, EIOPA suggests to abandon both the LLP and SW technique in favour of an extrapolation to the UFR that starts from the First Smoothing Point (FSP). Between these two values, forward rates are defined as follows:

EIOPA suggests to forbid the use of dynamic volatility adjustment in the SCR standard formula and also suggests to increase the prudency principle for internal models applying it.

Unexpectedly, EIOPA proposes changes to the Risk Margin (RM) too. The industry has criticized this metric because it is too sensitive to changes in the interest rates (and, therefore, to changes in their extrapolation) and it appears in general to be too large. The proposed new design reduces both the size and volatility of the RM, by multiplying future SCRs by a floored exponentially decreasing factor.

Finally, EIOPA advises that insurance companies with illiquid obligation should be able to classify more equity as LTE (Long Term Equity), benefiting of the low capital charge (22%, almost half of the normal equity holdings) associated to this asset class, introduced back in 2019 with the purpose of helping the sector, but with too stringent criteria to satisfy.

  • Solvency capital requirements (SCR)

EIOPA confirms its previous advice dated 2018 (relative shift approach), highlighting the need of modifying the IR risk calibration into a relative shift approach; EIOPA believes that the current design does not properly reflect the steep fall of interest rates into negative values. The proposed calibration works as follows:

The shocked interest rates in the downward scenario are floored to a minimum of -1.25%. This new calibration is expected to take a significant toll on the SII position of the companies, therefore EIOPA proposes to phase it in over a 5 years period. The proposals is a view of EIOPA and may not be adopted, as the European Commission will balance technical considerations to political ones. EIOPA has reiterated the advice of introducing negative interest rates in the SF SCR calculation in a number of Consultation Papers (first one dated 2018), at that time rejected by the EC.

  • Reporting and disclosure

EIOPA stresses the need of changing the Solvency and Financial Condition Report (SFCR) to improve its outreach. The report will be split into two parts: the first addressed to policyholders with a high-level content, while the latter addressed to a professional audience. Furthermore, the SFCR will be subject to a mandatory audit review.

Another proposal concerns the standardisation of the sensitivities on OF, SCR and SR:

In addition to that, companies may include other sensitivities when considered suitable to assess their own risk profile.

  • Proportionality

EIOPA wants to increase and standardize the level of proportionality across the three pillars of Solvency II. Companies that are eligible for proportionality measures, by passing objective criteria, have access to simplified methodologies for calculating their capital requirements.

  • Macroprudential policy

EIOPA advises to expand the Solvency II perimeter to include a macroprudential perspective: EIOPA and the NSA (National Supervisor Authorities) should be provided with the power to impose capital charges for systemic risk, to suspend shareholder dividend payments, to include macroprudential concerns in the ORSA, to impose concentration limits. In exceptional circumstances the supervisory authorities would even have the power to impose a temporary freeze on the policyholders’ redemption rights.

  • Recovery and resolution

EIOPA advises to integrate Solvency II with an EU-wide recovery and resolution framework for insurers and reinsurers. A relevant share of undertakings (chosen by size, cross-border activity, business model and risk profile) should be required to develop and maintain recovery plans as preventive measure. The occurrence of specific judgment-based conditions would trigger preventive measures such as more intensive dialogue and reporting and limits on variable remuneration and bonuses; further conditions (such as non-compliance with the SCR) would trigger the entry into the recovery and resolution phase, where more measures would be available to the supervisors, up to taking control of the undertaking.

  • Insurance guarantee schemes

EIOPA proposes to introduce a European network of insurance guarantee schemes, with a common minimum set of coverages, funded by all insurance undertaking. The insurance guarantee schemes are meant to protect policyholders either with a monetary compensation or by ensuring the continuation of their policy in case the insurance company becomes insolvent.

Il termometro dei mercati finanziari (1 Gennaio 2021)
a cura di Emilio Barucci e Daniele Marazzina

Gen 02 2021
Il termometro dei mercati finanziari (1 Gennaio 2021) a cura di Emilio Barucci e Daniele Marazzina

L’iniziativa di Finriskalert.it “Il termometro dei mercati finanziari” vuole presentare un indicatore settimanale sul grado di turbolenza/tensione dei mercati finanziari, con particolare attenzione all’Italia.

Significato degli indicatori

  • Rendimento borsa italiana: rendimento settimanale dell’indice della borsa italiana FTSEMIB;
  • Volatilità implicita borsa italiana: volatilità implicita calcolata considerando le opzioni at-the-money sul FTSEMIB a 3 mesi;
  • Future borsa italiana: valore del future sul FTSEMIB;
  • CDS principali banche 10Ysub: CDS medio delle obbligazioni subordinate a 10 anni delle principali banche italiane (Unicredit, Intesa San Paolo, MPS, Banco BPM);
  • Tasso di interesse ITA 2Y: tasso di interesse costruito sulla curva dei BTP con scadenza a due anni;
  • Spread ITA 10Y/2Y : differenza del tasso di interesse dei BTP a 10 anni e a 2 anni;
  • Rendimento borsa europea: rendimento settimanale dell’indice delle borse europee Eurostoxx;
  • Volatilità implicita borsa europea: volatilità implicita calcolata sulle opzioni at-the-money sull’indice Eurostoxx a scadenza 3 mesi;
  • Rendimento borsa ITA/Europa: differenza tra il rendimento settimanale della borsa italiana e quello delle borse europee, calcolato sugli indici FTSEMIB e Eurostoxx;
  • Spread ITA/GER: differenza tra i tassi di interesse italiani e tedeschi a 10 anni;
  • Spread EU/GER: differenza media tra i tassi di interesse dei principali paesi europei (Francia, Belgio, Spagna, Italia, Olanda) e quelli tedeschi a 10 anni;
  • Euro/dollaro: tasso di cambio euro/dollaro;
  • Spread US/GER 10Y: spread tra i tassi di interesse degli Stati Uniti e quelli tedeschi con scadenza 10 anni;
  • Prezzo Oro: quotazione dell’oro (in USD)
  • Spread 10Y/2Y Euro Swap Curve: differenza del tasso della curva EURO ZONE IRS 3M a 10Y e 2Y;
  • Euribor 6M: tasso euribor a 6 mesi.

I colori sono assegnati in un’ottica VaR: se il valore riportato è superiore (inferiore) al quantile al 15%, il colore utilizzato è l’arancione. Se il valore riportato è superiore (inferiore) al quantile al 5% il colore utilizzato è il rosso. La banda (verso l’alto o verso il basso) viene selezionata, a seconda dell’indicatore, nella direzione dell’instabilità del mercato. I quantili vengono ricostruiti prendendo la serie storica di un anno di osservazioni: ad esempio, un valore in una casella rossa significa che appartiene al 5% dei valori meno positivi riscontrati nell’ultimo anno. Per le prime tre voci della sezione “Politica Monetaria”, le bande per definire il colore sono simmetriche (valori in positivo e in negativo). I dati riportati provengono dal database Thomson Reuters. Infine, la tendenza mostra la dinamica in atto e viene rappresentata dalle frecce: ↑,↓, ↔  indicano rispettivamente miglioramento, peggioramento, stabilità rispetto alla rilevazione precedente.

Disclaimer: Le informazioni contenute in questa pagina sono esclusivamente a scopo informativo e per uso personale. Le informazioni possono essere modificate da finriskalert.it in qualsiasi momento e senza preavviso. Finriskalert.it non può fornire alcuna garanzia in merito all’affidabilità, completezza, esattezza ed attualità dei dati riportati e, pertanto, non assume alcuna responsabilità per qualsiasi danno legato all’uso, proprio o improprio delle informazioni contenute in questa pagina. I contenuti presenti in questa pagina non devono in alcun modo essere intesi come consigli finanziari, economici, giuridici, fiscali o di altra natura e nessuna decisione d’investimento o qualsiasi altra decisione deve essere presa unicamente sulla base di questi dati.

Il termometro dei mercati finanziari (18 Dicembre 2020)
a cura di Emilio Barucci e Daniele Marazzina

Dic 19 2020
Il termometro dei mercati finanziari (18 Dicembre 2020) a cura di Emilio Barucci e Daniele Marazzina

L’iniziativa di Finriskalert.it “Il termometro dei mercati finanziari” vuole presentare un indicatore settimanale sul grado di turbolenza/tensione dei mercati finanziari, con particolare attenzione all’Italia.

Significato degli indicatori

  • Rendimento borsa italiana: rendimento settimanale dell’indice della borsa italiana FTSEMIB;
  • Volatilità implicita borsa italiana: volatilità implicita calcolata considerando le opzioni at-the-money sul FTSEMIB a 3 mesi;
  • Future borsa italiana: valore del future sul FTSEMIB;
  • CDS principali banche 10Ysub: CDS medio delle obbligazioni subordinate a 10 anni delle principali banche italiane (Unicredit, Intesa San Paolo, MPS, Banco BPM);
  • Tasso di interesse ITA 2Y: tasso di interesse costruito sulla curva dei BTP con scadenza a due anni;
  • Spread ITA 10Y/2Y : differenza del tasso di interesse dei BTP a 10 anni e a 2 anni;
  • Rendimento borsa europea: rendimento settimanale dell’indice delle borse europee Eurostoxx;
  • Volatilità implicita borsa europea: volatilità implicita calcolata sulle opzioni at-the-money sull’indice Eurostoxx a scadenza 3 mesi;
  • Rendimento borsa ITA/Europa: differenza tra il rendimento settimanale della borsa italiana e quello delle borse europee, calcolato sugli indici FTSEMIB e Eurostoxx;
  • Spread ITA/GER: differenza tra i tassi di interesse italiani e tedeschi a 10 anni;
  • Spread EU/GER: differenza media tra i tassi di interesse dei principali paesi europei (Francia, Belgio, Spagna, Italia, Olanda) e quelli tedeschi a 10 anni;
  • Euro/dollaro: tasso di cambio euro/dollaro;
  • Spread US/GER 10Y: spread tra i tassi di interesse degli Stati Uniti e quelli tedeschi con scadenza 10 anni;
  • Prezzo Oro: quotazione dell’oro (in USD)
  • Spread 10Y/2Y Euro Swap Curve: differenza del tasso della curva EURO ZONE IRS 3M a 10Y e 2Y;
  • Euribor 6M: tasso euribor a 6 mesi.

I colori sono assegnati in un’ottica VaR: se il valore riportato è superiore (inferiore) al quantile al 15%, il colore utilizzato è l’arancione. Se il valore riportato è superiore (inferiore) al quantile al 5% il colore utilizzato è il rosso. La banda (verso l’alto o verso il basso) viene selezionata, a seconda dell’indicatore, nella direzione dell’instabilità del mercato. I quantili vengono ricostruiti prendendo la serie storica di un anno di osservazioni: ad esempio, un valore in una casella rossa significa che appartiene al 5% dei valori meno positivi riscontrati nell’ultimo anno. Per le prime tre voci della sezione “Politica Monetaria”, le bande per definire il colore sono simmetriche (valori in positivo e in negativo). I dati riportati provengono dal database Thomson Reuters. Infine, la tendenza mostra la dinamica in atto e viene rappresentata dalle frecce: ↑,↓, ↔  indicano rispettivamente miglioramento, peggioramento, stabilità rispetto alla rilevazione precedente.

Disclaimer: Le informazioni contenute in questa pagina sono esclusivamente a scopo informativo e per uso personale. Le informazioni possono essere modificate da finriskalert.it in qualsiasi momento e senza preavviso. Finriskalert.it non può fornire alcuna garanzia in merito all’affidabilità, completezza, esattezza ed attualità dei dati riportati e, pertanto, non assume alcuna responsabilità per qualsiasi danno legato all’uso, proprio o improprio delle informazioni contenute in questa pagina. I contenuti presenti in questa pagina non devono in alcun modo essere intesi come consigli finanziari, economici, giuridici, fiscali o di altra natura e nessuna decisione d’investimento o qualsiasi altra decisione deve essere presa unicamente sulla base di questi dati.

Digital Banking Journey: a flexible path which needs to be adapted to our country
a cura di Tommaso Sacchi

Dic 18 2020
Digital Banking Journey: a flexible path which needs to be adapted to our country a cura di Tommaso Sacchi

Digital Banking: a glimpse on current situation

Digital banking can no more be considered a new topic, or a disruptive innovation adopted by some first movers. It is something already in place and well developed since 2008/2010. Its presence in everyday life has become more and more commonplace and today is unconceivable to consider a financial offer complete without an ancillary online service.

Global digital banking market is expected to raise up to $ 9 bln in 2026 with a growth CAGR of 16% (Research and Markets, 2020) during this forecasted period, also fostered by always new and efficient technologies and a more digitalized population. It is undoubted that this structural change brought more efficiency, less fixed costs, simpler access to banking services and a faster response to clients’ needs, only to mention main points. Digital banking is also spreading in other sectors such as telephony, smart-clock and assurance looking for a 360° service for always interconnected clients.

Europe follows this global trend showing a penetration of online banking generally quite high with an average of apx. 60% over total population, which is deemed to growth in future years, as well as an increase in cashless payments both through PCs and smartphones.

Within this evolving environment, Italy represents and unusual case being on one side one of the lowest-ranking country in terms of online banking utilization (34%) and cashless payment systems (apx. 6 thousand transactions pro-capite compared to the more than 20 thousand of UK and France) while on the other side a good incubator with Fineco (1999), CheBanca! (2008), Hellobank! and Widiba (2013), Hype (2015) and Illimity Bank (2018). All these institutes are successful bets with actual clients, in the case of Fineco fox example, accounting for more than 1,5 mln of deposits in 2019.

Digital innovation appears, therefore, to be well developed but sort of unable to complete the re-shaping of banking sector within the country. Barriers can be justified both by a population which is basically quite old (46 years old (Istituto nazionale di statistica, 2020)) and an expected fear of the change but also by some structural characteristics of the economic and social fabric which do not completely fit Italian system with a total digitalized solution.

Italy: a fractured environment with multiple challenges

More than in other European developed countries, the growth and evolution of Italy showed a different path among areas, with relevant discrepancies.

Italian economic environment is mainly composed by small-medium companies (SME) which accounts for apx. 80% of overall workers and apx. 90% of total companies (IlSole24Ore, 2019). Their contribution to GDP is far more relevant than in any other European country and by far more rooted with no short-term indication of change in act.

Strictly derived from past heritage, this configuration is still extremely actual and represents a significant part of Italian culture. SMEs’ role, particularly relevant above all in the Southern Regions, is also connected to the G.D.O. supply chain and big companies representing their fundamental and main contributor.

Different economies’ maturation among areas as well as country’s geographic configuration together with very differentiated level of services (first of all internet access) and richness level brought a coexistence of big and industrialized metropolis such as Milan, Turin and Rome and a constellation of small-medium cities based on a local and personalized economic fabric.

As represented in the chart above, in many Regions the economic environment is almost all composed by small merchants, companies with less than 20 employees or freelancers without any presence of big or international companies. This kind of environment tends to be less reactive to changes and above all greatly based on previous years habits. On the other side, international cities are directly in touch with new and disruptive shifts and, in a sort of way, aim to them.

As a direct consequence, level of internet connection and digitalization is greatly different within the country. According to the Digital Economy and Society Index (DESI) results for 2018:

  • in terms of internet coverage, all Italian Regions are well under the European average (apx. 57%) but with Lombardia being at 47% while Molise reports only 27% of houses reached by connection
  • regarding internet utilization, best performer is Emilia-Romagna with apx. 43% (European average is apx. 60%) while Campania reaches only 18% of population.

Another relevant and directly connected feature of this system is the excessive use of cash payments. Apx. 86% of population prefers to use cash for payments while for credit cards it remains only the residual 14% (Conte, 2019). If it is true that cash payments are far more related to small-medium value transactions, it has also to be noted that the annum pro-capite number of transactions with digital systems in Italy is 50.7 which differs a lot from the European average of 117.

Interesting to fully understand actual system are the reasons reported to sustain cash payments according to a panel of more than 5 thousand of Italian contributors.

Going through the different motivations here reported, it is possible to assess that some of them can be managed with recent technology innovations such as payments through smartphones which are becoming more and more easy and secure thanks to the facial recognition or the quickness to pay through an electronic devices without any signature needed.

Reasons addicted are clearly a further indication of a lack of financial digital education but also a clear reference on how current system is based on trust between contractors and simplicity.

Relatively small and self-consistent economic systems rely greatly on personalization and resilience.  Digitalization and money dematerialization appear complex services for SME which mainly demand for:

  • cash payments as they are simpler, direct incomings and less complex to be monitored (remarkable also as in these environments, most of commercial establishments do not have a POS for the intrinsic costs and so promote cash circulation),
  • physical bank offices were personalized, ad hoc counselling and loan facilities can be provided.

Direct and strict relationship with local bank workers is considered a value added to the services even if the time to access them is a bit longer.

All these characteristics do not let digital banking be less innovative or less central to the future of the system but can partially explain its different propagation.

Conclusions

Digital banking is the future and this fact is well known, by all insiders and not. Technology infrastructures, economic systems maturity and level of financial education are potentially not completely ready to sustain and foster this change.

A flexible approach for the change’s introduction in some areas could be beneficial and could also allow banks to exploit some potentialities still running.

In terms of technology, instead of proposing a completely digitalized solution without any human contact, it is possible to introduce a hybrid solution where digital can be an enhancement of physical offices. Automations useful to offer basic services like ATM withdrawals/deposits, basic loan requests or modifications to bank account information open 24/7.

Regarding physical bank offices, which represents a relevant fixed cost and can produce a limited marginality, some new solutions already in place abroad are banking hubs: cohabitation of multiple banks in the same building where co-investments can be done.

Rejuvenation of the population surely assure digital services providers a continuous growth of future customers but, above all in quite old countries such as Italy, the other portion of the population, which is also the high-income one, must be considered. At least now and in the short-term.

Considering all these points, it cannot be assumed that Italy is on delay on the digitalization process. It probably is at the correct status respect the actual environment on which the change process is taking place. To force it to speed-up or to blindly concentrate all effort in this direction disregarding potential source of profits could not be economical.

Bibliography

Adriana Capasso, “Nel 2020, la diffusione delle banche digitali raggiunge nuove vette in Italia”, Mobile Transaction, 2020

Jalpa Shah, “How Should Banks Approach Their Digital Banking Journey?”, Finextra – Blog, 2019

Statista, “Online banking penetration in selected European markets in 2018”, 2019

Statista, “Number of payment transactions involving non-MFIs per country in Europe in 2018”, 2019

Infodata, “Pmi, quanto conta in Italia il 92% delle aziende attive sul territorio?”, IlSole24Ore, 2019

Alessandro Graziani, “Il digitale cambia il modo di fare banca, ma le filiali resteranno ancora al centro”, IlSole24Ore, 2020

Roberto Ferrari, “Banche digitali 2020, molti clienti ma pochi ricavi. Ecco che cosa le aspetta”, Digital360, 2020

Alessandra Puato, “Banche, 5 miliardi per correre sul digitale”, ABI Lab, 2020

Global Digital Banking Platform Market By Component (Solution and Services), By Deployment Type (On-premise and Cloud), By Type (Retail Banking and Corporate Banking), By Banking Mode (Online Banking and Mobile Banking), By Region, Industry Analysis and Forecast, 2020 – 2026, Research and markets, 2020

Francesco Olivanti, “DESI regionale 2019: l’Italia digitale è divisa in due e lontana dalla Ue”, Digital 360, 2020

Marco Lo Conte, “Il contante piace ancora a sei italiani su 7. Ecco la mossa che può stravolgere i comportamenti”, IlSole24ore, 2019